The Calm Before the Storm

When the US President visited Beijing on 14–15 May 2026, Xi Jinping deployed his best men to the frontlines and flung open the gates of the Temple of Heaven alongside a 21-gun salute on Tian’anmen Square, welcoming the ‘disruptor’ turned ‘risk-manager’ with imperial-style hospitality at Zhongnanhai. The visit appeared to give birth to a new ‘constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability’ grounded in the steady, sound, and sustainable development of Sino–US relations. But anxiety and restlessness gripped spectators worldwide, who watched with scepticism for statements on Taiwan, Ukraine, and Hormuz, craving a Mao–Nixon style communiqué with less focus on mere optics regarding trade, tariffs, and technology. But no such historic reset was forthcoming. In fact, China and the US achieved very little except for a renewed branding of their relationship, with the Chinese-speaking world viewing it as 送钟 (song zhong, symbolically meaning a close/dud). The aftermath, though less dramatic, set the stage for a transition from an interregnum based on ‘transactional diplomacy’ – against the backdrop of strategic competition under Trump – to a world order deeply entrenched in realpolitik considerations of ‘flattening the edges’, amidst the push and pull from techno-oligarchies. Trump travelled with more than 20 dignitaries, including Nvidia’s Jensen Huang, Tim Cook of Apple, Elon Musk of Tesla and SpaceX, Larry Fink of BlackRock, and executives from Meta, Visa, JPMorgan, Boeing, and Cargill, of whom two were women. The atmosphere reeked of technological jealousy and a fierce one-upmanship over whose crown was bigger than the other’s.

China obviously made no pretence when declaring that the mandate of heaven favoured its rise as a historical inevitability. China, as the Middle Kingdom, is positioning itself as a sort of pillar of stability for friends and allies across the globe. While the shadow of a cross-strait volatility loomed large over the frail veil of stability between the two powers, Xi espoused that China and the US could be ‘partners rather than rivals’, stressing that ‘both countries should make it work and never mess it up.’ Having closed deals on Boeing and agricultural products such as soya, a positive momentum was reached. Trump’s actions in Iran already cast aside any doubts that the US would hesitate to get militarily involved in a crisis that might help it regain a foothold in East Asia’s regional dynamics. Trump’s initial plan to use the pending USD 14 billion Taiwan arms deal as a ‘negotiating chip’ with China was almost dropped following a casual remark by Trump for Taipei to simmer down – ‘Taiwan would be very smart to cool it a little bit.’ Even so, sparks erupted between China and Taiwan as Lai Ching-te blamed the mainland for instability, declaring ‘Taiwan is the defender of the status quo of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the region, China is the root cause of regional instability and change of the status quo’, while thanking Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio for reaffirming long-standing US policy towards Taiwan. On the other hand, nationalist sentiments surged inside China as posts opposing US arms sales to Taiwan went viral on Weibo. Notwithstanding the internal skirmishes, Xi Jinping warned that Taiwan remains ‘the most important issue’ in the bilateral relationship and that mishandling it could spark ‘clashes and even conflicts’.

Hence, despite the bonhomie between the two sides, no agreement was reached on the resolution of the Iran crisis, and no official communiqué was issued. So far, Trump alone has managed to bleed the global system of resources, and the war could reduce economic growth in Arab nations by USD 120–194 billion in GDP. A report circulated beforehand to China’s institutional elite titled ‘From the Suez Moment to the Hormuz Moment’ (从“苏伊士时刻”到“霍尔木兹时刻), issued on 17 April 2026 by China’s largest investment bank, CITIC Securities, celebrated Washington’s strategic retreat and argued ‘that the US in 2026 is in the position Britain occupied in 1956. Britain went to Suez to retake the canal, lost the canal, and lost the empire. The United States has gone to Hormuz to keep the strait open, has not kept it open, and is in the process of losing something larger than the strait, aka global hegemony.’ But the celebration misses a larger undercurrent – though Trump could not gain any leverage through the Iran war, a more tacit change is the palpable damage to the global economy and supply chains. Trump is now preparing for another onslaught on Iran. On top of that, the Russian President is slated to visit China very soon, marking his 25th visit, in contrast to Trump, who visited China after nine years. The Sino-Russian ties, thick as a marriage of convenience, are bound by a mutual spite for US arrogance and clearly overshadow the Sino–US duopoly, which hangs by a thread despite claims of entering a new phase. What then stares the globe in the face is the lost opportunity for a major breakthrough in these talks, which failed to orchestrate a cataclysmic renewal of faith in non-interventionist policies in the Hormuz Strait and instil life into the already shattering fabric of the Sino–US bromance. The optimism is caveated by US domestic politics, alliances, and wider systemic uncertainty. Some have called it a ‘Strategic Stalemate’ (战略相持), whereby the dominant logic dictates that stability now rests less on trust than on parity, resilience, and mutual constraint.

What looks routine must be viewed through the lens of the longue durée, or what China calls the transformation not seen in a century. The longue durée, popularised by the historian Fernand Braudel, prioritises slow-moving, structural changes in geography, climate, and society over short-term political and military events. One can clearly discern the tectonic changes that China is experiencing from within in terms of technology; instead of a quid pro quo for the Mar-a-Lago estate summit visit in 2017, China could have used this opportunity to extract normative concessions on the challenge of the Pax Silica. One concession is Trump’s silent position on Taiwanese independence, though given historical precedents, that seems an opportunistic manoeuvre. But there was no statement on Tibet. Today, the globe witnesses a kind of weaponisation of economic interdependence by China to extract reciprocal cooperation; against this backdrop, it becomes imperative for countries like India to leverage their comprehensive national strength in an effort to provide alternatives to a China-led world order. China’s ability to extract ‘time and space’ from the US is not just a wake-up call for neorealists who believe that the US ‘cannot defeat China’, but also a disturbing development for others like India, who should be deliberating on how to counter a Pax Sinica to protect their own interests. As a trend of localising economies begins to challenge the traditional techno-feudal global architecture, India should look towards aligning its interests with the positives that emerge from such interactions and learn from US’ acts of “engagement with commitment.”

*Dr Bhavna Singh