In a matter of months the United States will get a new administration. One of the questions dominating Indian minds is whether, or not, the new US administration, be it Republican or Democrat, will continue to make freedom, democracy, human rights, etc—the larger platform of so-called western values—a deciding factor in India-US relations. This has to be seen in the context of the constant needling of India by the State Department and its associated bodies such as the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) in the four years of the Biden administration. It’s in this context that the near apoplectic reaction in the US to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Russia has to be seen. The buzz in Western media, think-tanks and analysts has been that India should be punished for not adhering to “western values” and embracing a dictator like Vladimir Putin. They had to unhappily accept India buying oil from Russia, for the “greater good” of the western world, which would have been in dire straits but for the refined petroleum products of Russian origin that they bought from India. But in 2024, the embrace in Moscow has pushed them over the edge.
When the West and the US speak of “western values” and “American values” they make a case for exclusivity—as if they are an evolved culture. This is problematic, especially for a civilizational nation like India. Ironically, be it the US or any European nation, whichever side of the ideological divide may be in power, their “values” are all about their own interests. The US inevitably weaponises its so-called values as and when it suits it, and particularly when it seeks compliance from a specific country. So the Biden administration’s thrust towards “values-based foreign policy” is hypocritical. The US routinely kills persons inimical to US interests on foreign soil, but any possibility of something similar happening on US soil throws it in a tizzy. What American values does a terrorist like Gurpatwant Singh Pannun represent, for the US to be so protective about him? Is the Pannun case really about protecting an American citizen? How many American citizens did the US abandon in Afghanistan when their soldiers left in a hurry after Kabul fell to the Taliban? Several, and all of them because they were of Afghan origin. The West says it is protecting democracy in Ukraine. What democracy is it speaking of? Since when did Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who locked up his whole Opposition, become a great advertisement for democracy? Hence, all this talk about values deciding American foreign policy is actually a cynical exercise of power.
It is in this context that the possible differences between the two administrations have to be seen. If Joe Biden, or some other Democrat is elected US President in November, there will be continuity in policy. But if Donald Trump returns as President, past experience shows that there will be fewer pinpricks on “rights and values”. The current shrillness about freedom, democracy, muzzling of minorities has to a large extent to do with India’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, apart from the fact that a section of the current administration and the ecosystem identify Narendra Modi with Donald Trump, whom they detest, much more than they dislike the Republican establishment. Given that both Donald Trump and his vice presidential pick J.D. Vance think that the Ukraine war is a wasteful expenditure, and do not see Russia as an evil foe, less threatening noises are likely to come from the US about India’s Russia outreach if they come to power. It’s generally the State Department and its echo chambers that are the source of the negativity towards India. Most of the people handling the India portfolio are young wokes, coming from a university system that has gone radical left and rogue to a large extent. If left on its own, State—which often works in silos and is generally anti-India—would ride roughshod over India-US relations and run it aground. But it’s also a fact that much of the negativity of the State in the Biden administration gets negated by the Department of Defence, or at the level of the NSA, or the President’s National Security Council. In fact it is to Biden’s credit that he has not allowed relations with India to be derailed in spite of the push to corner New Delhi coming from some of the left loonies in his own party, his administration and the ecosystem they nurture. Hence, while there has been posturing, grand-standing, there has not been any substantive action against India. Even this grand-standing is likely to take a back seat in a Trump administration. It is important to quote J.D. Vance here: “We should pursue a foreign policy, a diplomacy of respect, and a foreign policy that is not rooted in moralizing.” But a lot of this will depend on how a Trump administration brings an unhinged State Department to shape, if at all. Trump will be in the mood for revenge. He would like to “drain the swamp” as he likes to describe it. As a result of which, friction between him and the established interests and power groups in his own government may prove to be one of the biggest stories of his second term as President.
Ultimately, what will matter is if the US understands the importance of India as an economic powerhouse, a democracy and as a bulwark against Chinese hegemony. Till date, this appears to be the case. There will always be lobbies and interest groups that will work against India, whoever is President. It is up to India to navigate these waters skilfully.