Hinduism is regularly characterised in the Western as well as Indian academia and media as Brahmanical. How does this description measure up against the evidence?
To begin with Hindu myths: A major myth of Vedic Hinduism is that of the Indra and Vrtra, in which Indra slays Vrtra. What are their respective varnas? Indra is a kshatriya, Vrtra is a brahmana; so, it is the Brahmin who gets killed. Similarly, a major myth of classical Hinduism is that of the struggle between Rama and Ravana, in which Rama slays Ravana. What are their respective varnas? Rama is a kshatriya, Ravana is a brahmana; so, it is again the Brahmin who gets killed. In both these myths the Brahmin gets killed, so this raises the question: is Hinduism Brahmicidal or Brahmanical?
A major Hindu doctrine is that of incarnations. In the traditional listing of the ten incarnations, Vishnu incarnates himself in only two of them as a Brahmin: as Vamana and as Parasurama, while his most popular incarnations remain those of Rama and Krishna. To describe this list as Brahmanical is also, therefore, a bit of a stretch.
A third point of interest is provided by the Hindu Trinity—Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva. While Vishnu and Shiva are widely worshipped, the worship of Brahma declined in India to such an extent that he is now worshipped in only a handful of places. This fact acquires significance in the present context because if any among the three gods may be said to have a special connection with Brahmins, it is Brahma. Once again, it becomes problematical to describe Hinduism as Brahmanical.
Hinduism, however, could be considered Brahmanical in another sense. It is said that upon seeing a grave injustice being committed, the Brahmin protests by saying: ‘Stop; otherwise, I will kill myself’, while a kshatriya protests by saying: ‘Stop; otherwise, I will kill you’. If Hinduism only adopted the first approach, so well honed by Mahatma Gandhi in our times, then one could argue that Hinduism is Brahmanical in this sense. Hinduism, however, does not confine itself to the first approach alone, despite Gandhi’s heroic efforts to foreground it.
Could it then be considered Brahmanical in the sense that the Brahmins enjoyed a privileged status within Hinduism? After all, they are to be punished the least for the various crimes, are often to be given precedence, are to be supported by the king when in distress, and so on. Such a depiction, however, ignores certain elements of the situation: In the case of theft, they are punished the most (Manusmriti 8.337-338); although they are to be shown preference by others, they themselves are instructed to recoil from such treatment (2.162); the ruler and others are meant to support them because hunger was an occupational hazard with them (4.7-8,133-4; 11.21), and so on. And the so-called privileges are not only subject to limitations, the privileges are balanced by special responsibilities (eg. 6.34). Moreover, there are periods in Indian history during which such privileges had not yet been conferred on them, as seems to have been the case with the early Vedic period, or had been in the main abolished, as in the three nibandhas (medieval legal digests)—Smritichandrika (c.1200), the Madanaratna (c.1400-1450), and Sarasvativilasa (sixteenth century)—seem to indicate. These privileges have of course become obsolete in the modern period, while these previously cited texts suggest that they were already considered so in many parts of India in the medieval period itself. Furthermore, differential provisions are not invariably discriminatory provisions, and even in the case of differential treatment for crimes in classical law, two Smritis, those of Katyayana and Vyasa, impose progressively higher punishments for the higher varnas.
Could Hinduism be considered Brahmanical because the Brahmins bore the brunt when the non-Hindu rulers of India chose to persecute Hindus? It is well documented that Alexander had them gibbetted, Sikandar Lodi had one burnt alive, even Akbar forced some of them to convert on his own admission, and the British executed Nand Kumar by resorting to a legal ruse. This, however, would endow the Brahmins with the halo of martyrdom. This would be inconsistent with the context in which Hinduism is often described as Brahmanical, which is pejorative. Moreover, it is clear from the history of Hindu resistance to foreign rule that not just Brahmins but Hindus from all levels of society participated in its defence. Meenakshi Jain has calculated that seventy percent of the freedom fighters sent by the British to the gallows during India’s freedom struggle were Brahmins, although they constitute under seven percent of India’s population. They may have formed the vanguard of the struggle in this sense but the struggle was, especially in its later stages under Mahatma Gandhi, was characterised by mass rather than class participation. Could Hinduism be considered Brahmanical in a genetic sense, in the sense that all Hindus are derived from the Brahmins? The suggestion may appear far-fetched but there is some textual basis for this.
Some sacred texts state that originally there was only one varna or “caste”. In some accounts these original people are called Hansa, but in other texts it is stated that originally, in the ‘golden age’ as it were, there was only the Brahmin class, and the later varnas arose from it when, for various reasons, the Brahmins abandoned their original vocation and took to other means of livelihood. This carries the implication that the so-called caste system is a product of cosmic degeneration so that if one wishes to restore the ‘golden age’, as the rulers are exhorted to, then all caste and class distinctions need to be eliminated. But perhaps the implications of this view are too radical for those who like to describe Hinduism as Brahmanical, although the convergence of this perspective with some modern revolutionary ideas, which proclaim the need for a caste-free and class-free society, is hard to overlook. Moreover, the fact that the Brahmins constitute the centre and not the top in this scheme may also not be welcomed by all.
Could Hinduism be considered Brahmanical in yet another sense. Hinduism has been repeatedly characterised as Brahmanical in modern times, when its social system was identified as the ‘caste system’ under British rule. This process gained momentum after the institution of the British census from 1881 onwards. The Indians on whom the British relied during this process were largely Brahmins, as documented by Nicholas Dirks (in Castes of Mind, p. 225-226). One could then say that, in this sense, the modern caste system is Brahmanical. It could also be considered Brahmanical during this period in another sense. Two parts of India where the popular sentiment against the Brahmins was quite strong are Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra. In these parts it was the Brahmins who first took to English education with alacrity as a source of employment under the British government and thereby came to dominate the lower echelons of British administration. People thus came in contact with them as employees of the British government and arguably came to resent the power they seemed to have over them. Such exposure on their part of the myrmidons of the law then either reinforced the traditional caste dominance, or the hostility felt by the people has been mistakenly attributed to religious factors. It is doubtful, however, that those who describe Hinduism as Brahmanical have such considerations in mind.
Could not modern Hinduism, however, be considered Brahmanical in another sense. Hinduism is often represented as undergoing a renaissance during the modern period, which is frequently depicted as the outcome of the work of a series of Hindu reformers from Raja Rammohun Roy (d. 1833) to S. Radhakrishnan (d. 1975). Most of these were of Brahmin lineage, and modern Hinduism could be considered Brahmanical in this sense. There are, however, notable exceptions to this in the figures of Keshab Chunder Sen, Vivekananda, Mahatma Gandhi and Aurobindo. Moreover, if we take a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach to the issue and ask—who are the most influential among these reformers?—then probably Gandhi would be considered the most influential. And if we asked for two of them to be named, then Vivekananda will probably be included in this roll of honour. This consideration generates the paradox of an allegedly Brahmanical tradition being influenced by non-Brahmins the most!
It could be argued, however, that although these modern reformers are not Brahmins themselves, what they were propagating was a religion shaped by Brahmins, and that Hinduism is Brahmanical in this sense. And that this holds true for the whole history of Hinduism. This raises the question: Who shaped Hinduism? Vedic Hinduism was shaped by the rishis or seers, many of whom had origins sometimes unorthodox to the point of being unnatural as in the case of Agastya and Katha. There is also the danger of anachronism in viewing the social reality in terms of ‘caste’ distinctions during a period when the system may not be in place. Later, Kshatriyas appear as teachers in the Upanishads. Classical Hinduism was shaped in Tamil Nadu by the Alvars and the Nayanmars who came from different social backgrounds including the untouchables. The point may even cut deeper, that spiritual saints and not Brahmins are the generating centres of Hinduism.
But could it then not be claimed that Hinduism is Brahmanical because Brahmins are its transmitters, that Hinduism may not be Brahmanical in terms of its mythology, theology, ethics, or even history, but may be considered so because it was mainly transmitted by the Brahmins over the centuries. Hence it should be described as Brahmanical.
If the Brahmins transmitted the sacred texts of the Hindus then it makes sense to ask: Who transmitted the texts of the early Buddhists and the Jainas? These texts were originally transmitted orally in the case of these two traditions as well, like the Vedas, so it is quite a relevant question to ask. According to a well-known study cited by A.L. Basham (in The Origins and Development of Classical Hinduism p. 130) about forty percent of the monks in early Buddhism, whose origins can be ascertained, came from a Brahmin background. Similarly, the twelve Ganadharas, who decoded and transmitted the teachings of the last Jaina Tirthankara, Mahavira, were all of Brahmin lineage. So, it turns out that the Brahmins were involved in the transmission of the texts of all the three members of the classical Indic religious tradition: Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. So, if Hinduism is Brahmanical, should the early Buddhist, Jaina traditions also be so characterised?
But perhaps one has been looking for the Brahmanical nature of Hinduism in the wrong places. It is in its sociology that Hinduism is Brahmanical, for the Brahmins are the first to be mentioned in the list of the four varnas, which spells out a hierarchy. These four varnas are those of the (1) Brahmanas (Vedic scholars, priests, and so on), (2) Kshatriyas (warriors, kings, bureaucrats, and so on), (3) Vaishyas (traders, businessmen, agriculturists and so on) and (4) Shudras (servants and so on). What then, one might ask, is this hierarchy based on? Is it based on power? If that were the case the Kshatriyas would be heading it. Is this based on wealth? If that were the case the Vaishyas would be heading it. Is it based on service? If such were the case the Shudras would be heading it. It is obviously based on ritual and moral purity and scriptural learning, as these are associated with the Brahmins who have been placed on top. This problematises the point under discussion on account of the common perception that those at the apex of a social system tend to monopolise wealth and power in their hands. It is possible to argue that the Brahmins, as a class, may have cornered these in some parts of India or during certain periods of its history, but it is certainly not a feature of the scheme itself.
The classical formulation of this scheme is usually located in the Manusmriti, which is assigned by scholars to the second century. One look at the title of that text also seems to problematise the point further. The text is named after Manu, who was a kshatriya! So, it may be a Brahmanical text but it seems to appeal for its authority to a non-Brahmin. Incidentally, Manu is also considered a major legal authority in Burmese Buddhism. This could suggest that the Brahmins and the rulers, the Kshatriyas, joined hands in exploiting the other classes. This could well be the case. But in that case Hinduism should not be described as Brahmanical but rather Dvijaite in character. This verbal oddity results from one’s desire to couch the exploitation of the lower castes and classes by the three higher varnas, those of Brahmanas, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas together, into traditional idiom in which all three are called dvijas or twice-born, on account of their right to wear the sacred thread, a right denied to the Shudras (and to women). This would correspond somewhat to the ‘Brahmin-Bania conspiracy’ in modern ideological name-calling.
But then Hinduism will have to be considered as characterised by a Dvijaite rather than a Brahmanical conspiracy. Support for this point comes from a surprising source. Readers may be familiar with the concept of WASP, short for White Anglo-Saxon Protestants, who constitute the dominant component of American culture. This concept was apparently developed by E. Digby Baltzell, who taught at the University of Pennsylvania before he died in 1996. He was a sociologist as well as a student of Hinduism. If the category of WASP was developed by him on the prototype of the Dvijas (the male members of the three higher varnas) in Hindu sociology, as is generally accepted, then those who describe Hinduism as the hotbed of Brahmin-Bania conspiracy may be closer to the mark than those who describe it as a Brahmanical conspiracy.
This has the support of the Hindu dharmasutras, one of which, the Apastamba, concludes by stating in the penultimate shutra or aphorism that, in matters of dharma, the norms set by the twice-borns or dvijas should be considered authoritative. This seems to clinch the issue, but for the fact that the last aphorism of the same text also says: Others are of the opinion that in these matters the views of all the varnas and of women should be taken into account.
It is clear therefore that Hinduism contains two streams of thought within it. According to one, the male members of the three higher varnas are meant to be arbiters of dharma. According to another school of thought, however, all the varnas, and women as well, had to be part of the process. As Hinduism encompasses both these views it would be incorrect to claim that Hinduism is Brahmanical even if the term is used as a synecdoche and the Brahmins, who constitute a part of the dvija category, are made to stand for the whole of it which consists of kshatriyas and Vaishyas as well. One could also identify such a ‘Brahmanical Hinduism’ in a neutral, a positive, and a negative sense. A neutral version will be purely descriptive. The positive version would denote the version of Hinduism which the dvija, or a narrower ‘priestly class’, may identify as the ideal version of Hinduism from its point of view which it might wish for, or favour, or espouse. One could similarly think of a Kshatriya or a Vaishya or a Shudra (or a Dalit) version of Hinduism. In a negative sense it could denote how these groups may have manipulated or seek to manipulate Hinduism in their favour at the expense of its other constituents.
Thus, it may be valid to say that there can be a Brahmanical Hinduism but not to say that Hinduism is Brahmanical as this statement misrepresents Hinduism. The situation in this case is not very different from the one we encounter in the case of other religions. It seems valid to say that there is a jihadist Islam, but if one were to describe Islam itself as jihadist one would be overstating the case. One could identify what one might call Christian imperialism, but to identify Christianity with imperialism would be misleading.
The writer is the Birks Professor of Comparative Religion at McGill University in Montréal, Canada. He is also associated with the Nalanda University in India. The views expressed are personal.