Theaterisation is essentially an integration, of different service HQs prosecuting operations in a common front. All that front’s war fighting assets are placed under the command of that one theatre commander, thereby making his operational decisions faster and making him directly accountable for them. Doing so also reduces many duplications that occur if multiple Army/Navy/Air Force HQs in the same front do the same thing in a longer time cycle by coordination via their respective HQs at Delhi.
Is it needed? Yes 110%. As the experience of many battles over centuries have shown, the side which can decide, and act faster will have distinct advantage. This is also Col Boyd’s famous ‘OODA (observe, orient, decide and act) Cycle’. And if we need to at least match the OODA cycle of an adversary who has already made Theatre HQs, then we also need to make Theatre HQs. China has Theatre HQs, and Pakistan is unfortunately an “Army which has a country”, and its Army decides everything.
Who currently controls our military response? Each service (Army, Navy, and Air Force) currently has geographical Command HQs. Army has 6 regional Commands (North, West, South-Western, Southern, Central & Eastern), Navy 3 (Western, Eastern, & Southern) and Air Force 5 (Western, South-Western, Southern, Central & Eastern). While these commands are static HQs, actual military operations are done by the Army’s ‘Corps’, Navy’s ‘Fleets’ and Air Force Squadrons in their respective ‘Bases’, which are grouped under these 14 Regional Command HQs. Actions of/orders to these 14 HQs are currently given by their respective service HQs, who interact with each other for operations through HQ IDS (Integrated Defence Staff) – all at Delhi. Theaterisation threatens no service core competency or war fighting methodology and only leverages these for better outcomes.
Theaterisation envisages placing Corps/Fleet/Base operations under one integrated HQ for that front. In maybe 2-3 fronts, instead of current 14 HQs. Certainly, China and Pakistan fronts, and maybe a third maritime front to integrate all maritime responses against both conventional and non-conventional threats like the Mumbai attack. And at Delhi, coalescing services’ war-fighting branches under HQ IDS.
Will it work? Many countries have this concept in place including USA, UK, and China. Russia too was compelled to do something akin in the middle of the Ukraine conflict. For India, we need to find our own distinct solutions for each front. Do we have a precedence? Yes. The “Kargil Review Committee” (KRC) and “Group of Ministers” (GoM) reports tabled in Parliament in year 2000, felt this need for integration and on acceptance of their recommendations, the Govt on 01 Oct 2001 issued orders for raising HQ IDS and HQ ANC (Andaman & Nicobar Command) as integrated tri-service organisations. Prior that we had tri-service training establishments of NDA (National Defence Academy), DSSC (Defence Services Staff College) and NDC (National Defence College). 23 years of ANC – which also has Coast Guard under it, bear testimony of the viability of the concept of an Integrated HQ. ANC was raised to be under CDS “operational command”, but he was only appointed 18-years later, in Jan 2020.
What has been the ANC experience? Foremost – ‘it works’, and greatly reduces the OODA cycle. But works as envisaged, when under unitary and not committee command. Commander-in-Chief ANC (CINCAN) in an ‘interim arrangement’ prior CDS appointment was under operational control of a committee of three Service Chiefs (Chiefs-of-Staff Committee – COSC). 18 years witnessed hamstrung decision making since authority and accountability were not focussed, and service interests often over-rode ANC recommendations due to conflicts of interest. By way of integration, despite yeoman steps by our first and later CINCANS, it was due to this that reform was slow and a lot more got done towards integration at ANC in three years after the CDS appointment, than in the preceding 18 years. These efforts were greatly aided by the MoD’s visionary decision of Jun 2017 to merge all Army/Navy/Air Force/Coast-Guard lands at ANC under the CINCAN – since they are all Govt lands. This greatly empowered CINCAN’s integrative actions, which now just need CDS approval. Integrated operations, logistics, communications – including a common LAN, land use, infrastructure planning, Station HQ for administrative issues, Messes, sports and CSD facilities and many other such ANC initiatives between 2021-23 are successful examples of how these can be replicated on the mainland too. Something the Hon’ble Prime Minister yet again encouraged the Services to do during the Combined Commanders Conference at Bhopal on 01 April 2023.
Towards this, a lot of integrative work has been done by the CDS and Service Chiefs – away from media glare by keeping their discussions private. Some clarity by the Govt, on allocation of four additional 4-star ranks for the three theatre commanders and the Vice CDS (VCDS) and possible similar integration of all MoD lands -including Coast Guard and its lands, as planning terms of reference, will go a long way in enabling early plan finalisation. Additional aspects are elaborated in an article “3-Elephants of Theaterisation” published on 12 Aug 24 in the Daily Guardian.
There will be turf resistance, but a Govt which has raised ANC and HQ IDS in 2001, merged ANC lands in 2017, appointed a CDS in 2020, and has been encouraging the Services to theaterise for many years now, will certainly have the resolve to make this most transformative military change of independent India. Needed now in National interests, is for other political parties to respect and support this urgent theaterisation need. Because enemies at our borders will not wait for us to first get our act together. And there are no silver medallists in war.
Lt Gen Ajai Singh, a 5th generation soldier, Kargil & Siachen war veteran and former CINCAN authored “Army HQ Reorganisation” post Dokalam (more agile/accountable decision making) & ‘Army Strategic Re-orientation” after Galwan.