Three Elephants of Theaterisation

Elephants that will determine the optimality of our Theaterisation efforts are: (a) subsuming of 14 single service regional commands (6 Army, 5 Air Force & 3 Navy) (b) rank of theatres commanders, (c) HR issues post subsuming – managing of surplus officer cadre of services and consequent drop in promotion vacancies. All major Indian military […]

by Lt Gen Ajai Singh - August 12, 2024, 11:02 am

Elephants that will determine the optimality of our Theaterisation efforts are: (a) subsuming of 14 single service regional commands (6 Army, 5 Air Force & 3 Navy) (b) rank of theatres commanders, (c) HR issues post subsuming – managing of surplus officer cadre of services and consequent drop in promotion vacancies.

All major Indian military reforms the past 50 years have been carried out under the NDA government. Three most important of these regarding integration/theaterisation include: (a) Raising of tri-service institutions: Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) – an Integrated Theatre Command of Army, Navy, Air Force & Coast Guard, and Integrated Defence Staff HQ (HQ IDS) on 01 Oct 2001 and Strategic Forces Command (SFC) on 04 Jan 2003. These recommendations also included appointment of a CDS. A 2003 Vice Chief recounts how orders for a CDS too were passed by late PM Vajpayee one evening in 2003, but rescinded at about 2.30 next morning when he was woken up by the opposition leader accompanied by another senior politician, to express grave concerns on appointing a CDS expressed to them by one of our three services, (b) Jun 2017 orders of Hon’ble RM merging all lands of Army, Navy, Air Force & Coast Guard at ANC (on behalf of the GoI/MoD) under its Commander-in-Chief (CINCAN) (c) 01 Jan 2020 appointment of a CDS – 18 years after approval. Now, the much-needed “Theaterisation of military assets of MoD” is the most visionary military reform. A CDS charter, the services have unfortunately been unable to formulate their recommendations, despite the Hon’ble PM’s full support.

Under the CDS, we have progressed a lot from Jointmanship to Integration. The last step of Theaterisation, however needs Service Chiefs to sign the dotted line – unless Theaterisation is to be ordered like the Goldwater-Nichols Act. A signature that will reduce their own operational powers and relevance. If the outcome of 2+2 is to be more than 4 (essence of theaterisation) then “Turkeys need to vote for Thanksgiving Dinner” or “Chicken for tandoori tonight”. These first-hand views have repeatedly been articulated in multiple fora over two years while CINCAN.

Subsuming 14 Regional Commands (RCs). China has theaterised quickly with top-down orders, while Pakistan is convolutedly ‘an Army that has a country’ and so de-facto theaterised. To match up, we need operational theatre commanders with direct control over Army Corps/Navy Fleets/Air Force bases in their area, like current RCs do, or how ANC controls its components (including Coast Guard). Services retain their warfighting and professional strengths and only their application planning in the theatre HQs is integrated as at ANC – in fully integrated and not service specific amalgamated verticals. This ANC model is also what Gen Rawat, the CDS in Sep 2021 had tasked the services to emulate in the theaterisation studies ordered by him. Such Integrated HQs will produce faster decisions/responses in keeping with future battlefield needs and adversaries’ faster decision cycles. Our 14 single service HQs thus need integration into 2 (China & Pak) or 3 (China, Pak, and Maritime) threat-based fronts, otherwise theatres will just be an extra layer and not achieve their basic purpose. Above theatres, current higher defence organisation could continue – with CDS and Chiefs added. However, “operational command” of theatres must be ‘unitary’ under CDS, and not dissipated under a “Committee” of Service Chiefs (COSC) as prior CDS. “Ek mayan mein ek hi talwar hoti hai” and Services are commanded by their Chief and not a Committee of their RCs, and a Nation is led by a PM and not a Committee of Ministers.

ANC achieved more in its ‘theaterising efforts’ in two years under CDS’s operational command, than in 18 years prior under COSC. For Theatre emancipation, services’ operation related branches would need shifting to HQ IDS under CDS operational control. The CDS would also need a Vice CDS (VCDS) for controlling theatre operations and for redundancy. As in service commands, for effective theatre control, VCDS should be of CDS rank.

Theatre Commander Rank. Considering span of control and operational responsibilities, must be of 4-star rank. But then, what will 4-star Service Chiefs do, if COSC (like now for ANC), does not retain operational control over theatres? As per current planning, ‘ceremonial service head’, and “Raise-Train-Sustain” (RTS) functions. If, however, the Govt cannot overcome pressures of various lobbies against sanctioning 3-4 additional 4-star vacancies for this most major military reform of independent India, then the three current 4-star ranks should shift to the 2/3 envisaged Theatre Commands and VCDS appointments, and RTS can then be done by Service Vice Chiefs. In this sub-optimal solution, Theatre Commanders would dual-hat as Service Chiefs, which would detract from their operational focus, as it does now.

HR Issues. In the subsuming of RCs, there is a genuine fear inducing amygdalan response, against loss of many senior appointments/ranks, that resists change. This needs a deliberate solution for change acceptability. The resistance is justified too, for Services see continual proliferation of senior ranks in Group A services, while the armed forces pyramid is already very steep and subsuming RCs will greatly exacerbate this and also make many stations, HQ buildings, and lands redundant. While this can be managed by placing all military lands under the CDS like at ANC and making a C-in-C equivalent officer incharge, HR implications for senior ranks’ reduction, needs deliberation and Govt backed solutions. Like with Agniveer, maybe highest-level directional clarity on lucrative golden handshakes or NFU in situ etc. Currently unfortunately, no one is speaking of these issues and downstream planning can only take place once there is clarity on Govt direction on these 3 major issues.

ANC under its visionary first CINCAN Adm Prakash, had adopted a common combat dress based on Army dress pattern. This integrative vision worked well for 21 years till the Army suddenly changed its combat dress. Remaining ANC Navy, Air Force & Coast Guard offrs still wear common ANC combat dress. We thus also need to communicate better between Services, and as in many Nations, adopt a common combat dress as ANC had, and possibly even common ranks. That would be a good first step for visible integration which will also help break many mental silos.

Once these three higher level decisions are clear, theatre specific HQ structures are a matter of detail and can be worked out in a few months. Bereft of this, we will keep deliberating sub-optimal solutions without adequate clarity on the most important aspects that will drive downstream detail. This is why service consensus too is lacking since Jan 2020. With threat on both our undemarcated borders, and inimical neighbourhood activities, we need to progress urgently on this great transformative opportunity, which fortunately is being encouraged by no less than our Hon’ble PM.

One hopes political parties will understand the imperative to Theaterise, and so meet the operational tempo our potential adversaries can already generate. At least in National Security issues, it should not be ‘my party right or wrong’, but “Our Country Right or Wrong”.

Lt Gen Ajai Singh, a 5th generation soldier, Kargil & Siachen war veteran & former CINCAN authored “Army HQ Reorganisation” post Dokalam (more agile/accountable decision making) & ‘Army Strategic Re-orientation” after Galwan.