The 2026 BRICS Summit offers an opportunity to reconsider one of Asia’s most consequential bilateral relationships. India and China remain competitors in a number of areas, while differences persist over the boundary question, regional security and development priorities. Yet the relationship is also underpinned by substantial economic interdependence and shared interests. It would therefore be unrealistic to define India China relations solely through either competition or cooperation. A more sustainable approach is to build a framework of managed competition, selective cooperation and sustained dialogue. This may be the essence of a new Asian realism: acknowledging differences without allowing them to define the entire relationship; accepting competition without allowing it to become confrontation; and expanding cooperation wherever interests converge, while allowing both countries to maintain their respective strategic choices.
Managing competition, avoiding confrontation
India and China are both major Asian powers with different political systems, development models and strategic priorities. As their economic and international influence grows, overlapping interests and strategic differences will inevitably coexist. The objective, therefore, should not be to eliminate competition, but to prevent competition from becoming confrontation. The boundary question remains particularly sensitive and should continue to be addressed through established bilateral mechanisms and diplomatic dialogue. Maintaining peace and tranquility along the border is in the fundamental interest of both countries and provides an important foundation for broader economic and people-to-people engagement. A stable relationship does not require strategic convergence. India and China may hold different positions on international and regional issues and maintain their own relationships with other countries. What matters is that such differences do not unnecessarily turn into zero-sum rivalry or bloc confrontation. Mutual respect for each other’s core interests and legitimate security and development concerns, together with sustained communication, can provide the basis for managing differences responsibly.
From trade Imbalance to More balanced interdependence
Economic relations illustrate both the depth and the complexity of India-China ties. According to Indian official data, bilateral trade reached approximately $151.1 billion in 2025–26, making China India’s largest trading partner. At the same time, India’s trade deficit with China stood at around $112.16 billion. There are also signs of greater dynamism on the export side: Indian exports to China increased by more than 36 percent, reaching about $19.47 billion, while imports rose by around 16 percent. These figures point to two realities. First, economic interdependence has proved resilient despite political and strategic difficulties. Second, the structure of bilateral trade remains uneven and deserves attention. India has legitimate concerns about trade imbalances, market access and the development of domestic industries. China, meanwhile, has an interest in maintaining a stable and growing Indian market. Rather than viewing bilateral trade primarily through the question of who gains more, the two countries could work toward a more diversified and mutually beneficial economic relationship. India can further expand its strengths in areas such as information services, pharmaceuticals and selected manufacturing sectors, while China can contribute to broader market access and stable supply chains. The goal should not be artificial numerical symmetry, but greater reciprocity, diversification and sustainability in bilateral economic relations.
Competition does not have to Mean technological decoupling
Technology provides an other example of the coexistence of competition and interdependence. India has developed considerable strengths in software, digital public infrastructure and information services, while China has built substantial capabilities in telecommunications, electronics manufacturing, solar equipment, lithium-ion batteries and related supply chains. The two countries have also introduced restrictions and safeguards in sensitive technology sectors, reflecting legitimate concerns over data, national security and industrial policy. Such concerns deserve to be taken seriously. But security considerations should not automatically lead to comprehensive technological decoupling. Where risks are manageable, commercial interests are mutual, and cooperation complies with the laws and regulatory requirements of both countries, there remains scope for practical engagement. Such cooperaoperation should therefore aim not at creating exclusive blocs, but at strengthening the openness, stability and resilience of global green supply chains.
Reconnecting the two societies
A durable relationship cannot rely on governmentto-government dialogue alone. Greater connectivity between the two societies is equally important. The gradual restoration of direct flights, business travel, tourism, educational exchanges and academic cooperation would help rebuild mutual understanding after years of limited interaction. Universities and think tanks can play a particularly useful role by maintaining channels of dialogue on difficult issues, including the boundary question, trade, technology and regional cooperation. Such exchanges do not require either side to abandon its own position. Their value lies precisely in creating space for communication despite differences. The ability to continue talking when disagreements remain is itself an important sign of a mature relationship.
Green development and the global south
Green development offers another promising area. India and China face common challenges in balancing economic growth, energy security and climate goals. Both have developed significant capabilities in renewable energy and related manufacturing, creating potential for cooperation in areas such as clean energy, energy efficiency and green supply chains. The significance of such cooperation extends beyond bilateral relations. As two major countries of the Global South, India and China share an interest in making clean technologies more affordable and accessible to developing economies.
Towards a new asian realism
BRICS provides an important platform for India and China to cooperate on development, global economic governance and the interests of the Global South. But multilateral cooperation cannot replace bilateral engagement. A stable relationship requires both effective bilateral mechanisms for managing differences and multilateral platforms for expanding areas of common interest. A new Asian realism should not assume that India and China will become strategic partners, nor should it expect all disagreements to disappear. It should instead recognize that the two countries will compete, cooperate and manage differences at the same time. Its basic principles can be stated simply: competition without confrontation, cooperation without requiring strategic convergence, and dialogue without demanding the immediate resolution of every dispute. The future of India-China relations should therefore not be built around the unrealistic goal of eliminating differences, but around the practical task of managing them while expanding common interests. The post-BRICS moment offers an opportunity not for a dramatic transformation, but for something potentially more durable: a more mature relationship in which differences are managed, cooperation is strengthened, strategic autonomy is respected, and competition is kept within constructive bounds. For India and China, this is not merely a bilateral choice. How the two countries manage their relationship will also shape the prospects for a more stable, open and cooperative Asia.
*Dr. XIAO Jianmei is Associate Professor & Coordinator of China Center for South Asian Studies, Sichuan University. Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (retd) is Former Chief of Integrated Defence Staff & Commander in Chief, Western Naval Command