India’s grand strategy of strategic autonomy, manifested in its approach of multialignment, has allowed the country to thrive in an emerging global order of messy multipolarity. Yet, modern power politics and great power coercion also show that this approach faces real-world structural boundaries. To thrive, leading middle powers need to precisely redefine the ends-means-ways chain of grand strategy to transform passive assets into active political leverage.
The idea of strategic autonomy and the approach of multialignment are foundational to India’s grand strategy—and have proven remarkably successful in recent years. As a result of playing a more assertive role in international politics today, India has become an increasingly sought-after partner.
The recent sessions at the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi confirmed this trend, as global officials and policymakers emphasized the need for closer cooperation with India in what felt almost like a competition for alignment.
While many states find it challenging to navigate escalating global tensions—resulting from US-China systemic competition, Russia’s war against Ukraine, or shifting transactionalist power politics—India has established itself as a player that masterfully engages with all sides.
This is particularly well illustrated by its parallel ties with Russia and Europe. Despite maintaining and even deepening ties with Moscow, which Europe considers the gravest threat to its continental security, New Delhi has simultaneously signed a landmark Free Trade Agreement and a comprehensive Security and Defence Partnership with the European Union, while actively negotiating an agreement for the exchange of classified information.
India’s partners seem to accept these inherent tensions, recognizing that they are not going to alter what has established itself as Delhi’s doctrine over decades: multialignment.
Navigating Weaponized Interdependence
Nevertheless, there is a strong case to be made that multialignment alone might face strategic bottlenecks in an era of weaponized interdependence and erratic great power politics.
This approach reveals structural limits when external shifts occur; after Delhi and Washington invested significant political energy into leveling up their bilateral relationship over the last few years, sudden shifts in trade and tariff policies disrupted those consolidated efforts, including through the imposition of significant economic tariffs on India.
Although India has successfully maintained its ties with other actors and invested in alternative regional partnerships, the fact that a leading power cannot completely shield itself from external economic pressure offers valuable lessons on strategic autonomy for other global partners constructing grand strategy in a fractured world.
The Ends-Means-Ways Chain
India’s example shows that it is not enough for leading middle powers to implement strategic autonomy through multialignment alone; they must consequently define and execute a precise structural chain of ends, means, and ways in their grand strategy.
While India has a clear vision of its own role and the future of the global order (ends) and has generally implemented this through multialignment, its exposure to external economic friction demonstrates the vital importance for middle powers to leverage their strategic assets more effectively.
The country possesses formidable assets—as a critical regional and global security partner, an economic powerhouse, and a rapidly growing tech power—but must continue to transform these hard resources into actual relational power to fully shield itself from coercion.
Defining their strategic toolkit (means) and the active avenues to deploy it (ways) can protect middle powers from great power coercion, allowing them to thrive through robust middle-power partnerships in the shadow of strategic competition.
ETH Zurich & NXT Fellow 2026
