NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court of India has asked the Union Government and the Government of Uttar Pradesh to explain why the rules required under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937—specifically under Section 4—have not been framed even after decades, potentially rendering key provisions of the law ineffective.
A bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih issued notices to both the Union of India and the State of Uttar Pradesh, directing them to file affidavits clarifying the status of the rule-making exercise under Section 4.
Section 4 of the 1937 Act empowers the state government to frame rules specifying the authority before whom a Muslim can make a formal declaration under Section 3 to be governed by Shariat law in matters of marriage, inheritance, maintenance, guardianship and other personal law domains. However, the top court noted that no rules have been put in place, creating a statutory vacuum that undermines the effective implementation of the Act.
Under Section 3, a Muslim can choose to be governed by Shariat law by filing a declaration with a prescribed authority. Once such a declaration is accepted, the person—and in some cases their descendants—would have their personal laws governed by Shariat principles instead of secular statutes. However, without rules under Section 4 to designate the competent authority, set procedures and establish forms for filing such declarations, these provisions remain difficult to operationalise.
The matter came before the Supreme Court in an appeal challenging a 2011 Delhi High Court judgment that had invalidated a 1992 Will. The appellant, Gohar Sultan, daughter of the deceased testatrix Musarraf Begum, had sought to sustain the Will on the basis that the testatrix intended to be governed by Shariat law. The High Court, however, held that because no formal declaration had been made under Section 3 of the Shariat Act, the Will had to be probated under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 which imposes stricter evidentiary requirements.
During the hearing, counsel for the appellant argued that the absence of rules under Section 4—framed by the State government—made it impossible for the testatrix to file a valid declaration under Section 3, effectively denying her the statutory choice to be governed by Shariat law.
The Supreme Court took note of this statutory gap and expressed concern that without the requisite rules specifying form, authority and procedure, individuals are unable to benefit from the Act’s provisions. The bench was inclined to implead the Union of India and the State of Uttar Pradesh as parties to the appeal to get authoritative answers on why the rules under Section 4 remain unframed.
As a result, the court has directed the matter to be re-listed on February 18, 2026, and asked the newly added respondents to file updated affidavits indicating the latest status of the rule-framing process.
The development highlights the ongoing judicial scrutiny over long-pending legislative inaction that affects the implementation of personal laws and the rights of individuals seeking to exercise statutory options under them.
