The Kerala High Court in the case George M. Mathews @ George V. Muhammed Haneefa Rawther observed and has held that the ‘willingness’ and ‘readiness’ willingness’ under Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 are being distinct and the ones who does not imply with other. It has been observed by the court that while readiness refers to the capacity of the plaintiff for enforcing the said contract, the said willingness refers to the conduct of the plaintiff warranting performance. As per the court, the specific performance of a contract can only be enforced if readiness is being backed by willingness.
The division bench comprising of Justice K Vinod Chandran and Justice C Jayachandran in the case observed while hearing an appeal filed against the order of the Sub Court, Pathanamthitta and it has been directed that the defendant to specifically perform a contract of sale of a property entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant. Therefore, the contract for sale was entered into with the defendant as the vendor and the plaintiff as the vendee. The Defendant aggrieved with the order of the lower court filed an appeal before the High Court.
It has been observed by the said court that the defendant had shown the readiness for performing the contract in terms of his financial capacity, but the defendant had failed to prove his willingness to perform the contract through the said conduct . According to Section 16(3) of the Act, the court cannot enforce the specific performance of a contract of a person who fails to prove that he has always been ready and is wiling to perform the terms of the contract.
At the outset, it has been observed by the court that the financial capacity of the plaintiff/vendor to pay the sale consideration, willingness is a different component referable to the conduct of the vendor. Thus, the same being not axiomatic that one who is ready is automatically willing to perform the contract and the one who being ready with the funds can still be unwilling to perform the contract for different reasons altogether, say for example, the said vendor deems the transaction which is not feasible or is profitable for commercial reasons.
Adding to it, the court stated that under Section 20 of the Act granting a decree of specific performance is the discretion of the court and the said court is not bound for granting such relief just because it is lawful to do so.
It has been submitted by the counsel, defendant Adv S.Ananthakrishnan appearing for the appellant or that the buyer was never actually ready to purchase the property and that his readiness and willingness for not reflecting in his actions or conduct.
The counsel, Adv. K. S. Hariharaputhran appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that from the side of defendant it is failed to perform his obligations under the sale agreement, which stipulated the measurement of the property by the plaintiff due to which contract for sale could not be enforced.
The said court was satisfied on the basis of documents that the financial capacity and readiness of the plaintiff to pay balance consideration for the sale of the property. The court also found a lack of bonafide in the conduct of the plaintiff that due to several reasons which includes the suppression of several material facts and variance in the pleadings of and proof adduced.
The court while considering the facts and circumstances of the case stated that the plaintiff was not willing to perform the contract, even though he was ready with the funds for the sale consideration.
Accordingly, the court refused to exercise its discretion under Section 20 in favour of the plaintiff and the court set aside the impugned judgment in favour of the defendant. It has also been ordered by the court that the return of the advance of sale consideration to the defendant along with interest.
