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From Shah Bano to Mohd Abdul Samad: The Supreme Court’s role in safeguarding Muslim women’s maintenance rights

The Hon’ble Supreme Court (SC) of India has demonstrated time and again that it is willing to take the lead in defending the rights of the vulnerable and Muslim women in particular and repeatedly affirmed that Muslim women may apply for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC as the procedural legislation is secular in nature. In […]

The Hon’ble Supreme Court (SC) of India has demonstrated time and again that it is willing to take the lead in defending the rights of the vulnerable and Muslim women in particular and repeatedly affirmed that Muslim women may apply for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC as the procedural legislation is secular in nature. In the Recent judgement Mohd Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, the apex court upheld that Muslim women can seek maintenance under section 125 of CrPC even though they have an exclusive remedy under the Muslim women (Protection of rights on Divorce) Act 1986.

Section 125 of CrPC

According to Section 125 of CrPC, “any person having sufficient means” is required to support “his wife” or “his legitimate or illegitimate minor child” in the event that they are unable to support themselves. Usually, this entails providing monthly financial support. The section’s explanation makes it clear that a divorced woman who hasn’t gotten married again is included in the definition of “wife.”

Shah Bano V. Mohamud Ahamad Khan

In 1978, a Muslim woman named Shah Bano Begum filed a petition for maintenance against her husband Mohamud Ahamad Khan. Later in the same year, he divorced her by way of triple talaq and contended that, as per Muslim law, he is liable to pay maintenance only for 3 months post-talaq (iddat period) and not beyond that.

The case reached the Supreme Court of India in 1980 following the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s granting of Shah Bano’s plea. Then it was argued by the All-India Muslim board that the court is bound to apply the personal law as per The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 but not the Criminal Procedure code. However, the 5-judge constitutional bench consisting of the then Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice D.A. Desai, Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, Justice R.S. Pathak and Justice M. Hameedullah Beg upheld the decision given by the High court of Madhya Pradesh and ordered for the grant of maintenance. Then, Chief Justice of India Y V Chandrachud ruled those laws like Section 125 CrPC “cut across the barriers of religion” and that it makes no difference “whether the spouses are Christians or Parsis, Hindus or Muslims.” The court further decided that even after the Iddat period, the divorced wife was entitled to maintenance under Section 125 “if she is unable to maintain herself.”

The Muslim women (Protection of rights on Divorce) Act 1986: (MWPRD ACT)

The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act was passed by the Indian Parliament in reaction to the Shah Bano case, and it gave Muslim women who have divorced, a particular way to file for maintenance. It confined the amount to the mahr, or dowry, given to the woman, and limited the maintenance term to the iddat period and the divorced wife’s children or relatives were obligated to pay maintenance after the iddat period and in their absence, the State Wakf Board was made responsible.

Danial Latifi v. Union of India, 2001

The Danial Latifi, advocate of Shah Bano filed a petition in the Supreme Court of India challenging the validity of the MWPRD Act 1986. He contested that the MWPRD Act discriminates against Muslim women, infringing against their rights to equality (Article 14) and to a life with dignity (Article 21), and that Section 125 is intended to shield women of all religions without any discrimination. However, the centre and the All-India Muslim board contended that the MWPRD Act is in accordance with their personal law and by no means it is against the constitutional provisions.

The Supreme Court’s Constitutional Bench, consisting of Justices G.B. Pattanaik, S. Rajendra Babu, D.P. Mohapatra, Doraiswamy Raju, and Shivaraj V. Patil, while upholding the constitutional validity of the Act and extended the right of a Muslim woman to get maintenance until she re-marries. The Apex Court also ruled that Muslim husbands are liable to provide maintenance to their divorced wives beyond the iddat period until she re-marries.

Mohd Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana

Mohd Adbul Samad, the petitioner, contested a 2017 family court ruling for him to provide his ex-wife maintenance in the amount of Rs 20,000 per month. In response to an appeal, the Telangana High Court declined to vacate the family court’s ruling. On appeal to the apex court a two-bench comprising of Bench of Justices B V Nagarathna and George Masih upheld the judgement given by the High court and reiterated that section 125 of the CrPC being a secular legislation it is applicable even the divorce has been obtained through personal law.

Justice Nagarathna stated that Section 125 CrPC is “embedded in the text, structure and philosophy of the Constitution. The maintenance remedy is an essential source of support for the impoverished, abandoned, and underprivileged segments of the female population. It is an embodiment of the social justice ideology included in the constitution, which aims to free Indian wives—including those who have been divorced from the constraints of discrimination, disadvantage, and deprivation based on gender and nowhere in MWPRD Act created a bar to claim maintenance under section 125 of CrPC” and held that the section 125 of CrPC is an additional remedy in supplement to the right to maintenance under the personal law and also concluded that this section applies to all women irrespective whether they are married or not.

Hence time and again the Hon’ble Supreme court of India stood up to do complete justice to women of all religion and Muslim women in particular from “destitution or vagrancy.”

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