Crises force people to put on their thinking caps that remain lost when the going is good. One cannot help but notice that the states suffering most from Covid-19 are simply too large for management; both Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra need to be split into at least two states for the time being. While it is true that the smaller states have not exactly covered themselves with glory, the worst-hit states are the larger ones, with the sole exception of Delhi, which is sui generis: it is a city-state with dual control and political tussle. Moreover, it is too densely populated to be spared from such an infectious disease, irrespective of the size of the state. States like Assam had the benefit of leadership taking prompt decision suited to the local situation.
It cannot be a mere coincidence that in general, the best-governed states are the smaller ones. The key reason why smaller states are performing better is that smaller states reduce diversity. High diversity makes for complex political and administrative calculations. The whole point of creating linguistic states in the 1950s was to improve administrative efficiency. Consider how difficult it would have been to administer the huge Bombay Presidency with at least two major languages (Marathi and Gujarati), or the large Madras presidency (with four major linguistic groups to manage — Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, and Malayalam).
Political Science gives many reasons favouring smaller administrative units but I would drive home my point by one practical example. Rather than using clichés like “Uttar Pradesh is the fifth most populous country in the world,” I would give a practical example as to how such a large state is simply not sustainable. The average population of an assembly constituency here is around 6.20 lakh. Now suppose a citizen is not being heard by the local police station and after making all efforts for getting justice, the citizen feels that he needs to approach the higher authorities in Lucknow. He would have to be a really important person to land an appointment with his local MLA. Now suppose our victim does have some clout and is able to meet the MLA and also convince him about the genuineness of his cause. The MLA speaks to the Minister over the phone and requests him to direct the Superintendent of Police (SP) accordingly. Now, for this Minister the MLA is just one among the 503 other legislators and after assuring all the help, he simply forgets the matter. However, let’s assume our MLA is important for the government hence the Minister does send instructions down the line. But the SP is also aware that the Minister will soon forget the whole episode and he may not follow the instructions.
The same holds true for Maharashtra, with its 368 legislators, spread more than 1000 km across. Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The entire purpose of splitting the governance into three separate bodies was to ensure a system of checks and balances. Hence, the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary are expected to be independent of each other and yet work in tandem to prevent abuse of power. Judiciary is expensive, time-consuming, and can be approached only after the person has already suffered. Moreover, being over-burdened, it is hardly in a position to control the Executive.
Now contrast this situation to a resident of Goa, who is facing harassment by the local police station. Here, in an assembly constituency of 45,000 residents, almost everybody knows everybody. The citizen can approach the MLA who can counter-check the facts by speaking to the neighbours. Most of the times, the MLA himself can explain the position to the local police and the problem ends there. Otherwise, the MLA can take the citizen on his scooter to the residence of the Minister who knows all 40 MLAs personally. The MLA can assure him that he has cross-verified the facts and the citizen is being wronged. A phone call from the Minister will set right the issue.
Not just the theories of political science but this is the practical reason why citizens have fought bitterly for smaller states. A proper example is the creation of Uttarakhand. In the mid-1990s several activists were killed while seeking a separate state, many more were arrested and tortured brutally. More recently, Telangana was formed after a protracted struggle where several people resorted to the extreme step of self-immolation. Earlier, the 1960s witnessed a violent struggle for Maharashtra. The fight for a ‘Punjabi Suba’ was long and bitter, often endangering national security. The Northeast has seen several demands for smaller states. The Northern part of West Bengal wants to establish itself as a separate state in view of their distinct culture and the fact Kolkata is too distant, culturally different, and too pre-occupied to care for them. There must be some reason why people are willing to offer any sacrifice for a smaller state. The benefits over a period outweigh the pain of the struggles and the teething troubles of the new states.
Article 2 of the Constitution of India is very clear: the Parliament has the power to establish new states. Prime Minister Narendra Modi may not want to stir a hornet’s nest because the creation of new states will give impetus to the latent demand of statehood for Saurashtra and Kachchh. Politics aside, administrative exigencies require splitting of at least three states: Uttar Pradesh into Eastern and Western (whatever nomenclature they may choose); Maharashtra into Vidarbha and Maharashtra; and also, West Bengal. The Chief Ministers of smaller states with the ears to the ground would have been in a better position to handle a crisis of these proportions.
The author is an officer of the Indian Revenue Service. The views expressed are personal.
