The Madras High Court in the case A. Kaliyaperumal v. The Superintendent of Police observed and has held that the reckoning date for calculating the limitation period under Section 469 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, CrPC would be from the date of filing of the final report and not the date of registration of FIR.
The bench headed by Justice Anand Venkatesh in the case observed and has noted that in a case emanating from the FIR, cognizance is taken by the Magistrate upon the filing of the final report.
Adding to it, the court stated that the basis of the FIR is only information received by the police authorities and not a ‘complaint’ of which cognizance is taken.
Therefore, the said court went on the discussion while hearing the petition moved seeking to transfer an investigation on the ground that police had not taken steps to complete the investigation.
The court observed that in another case, the petition was moved for quashing the FIR as the final report had not been filed to date thus contending that there was a bar in taking cognisance.
The counsel, Additional Public Prosecutor informed the court that in the first case, the final report had been filed but since the final report was filed much beyond the period of limitation, the court had not taken cognizance of the same and issued notice to the accused.
The court in the case observed and has relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case Kishore v. State, wherein it is contended that there was no requirement for condoning since the complaint was lodged with the police within the period of limitation.
The bench headed by single judge in the case observed that the relevant date for Section 468 CrPC was the date of filing the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution.
The bench headed by Justice Venkatesh in the case observed and has opined that the single judge had misunderstood information given to the police under Section 154 CrPC as a complaint under Section 9(d). The court in the case observed that as per section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the registration of FIR was based on ‘information’ and the same could not be equated to a ‘complaint’.
It has also been noted by the said court that a complaint could be made only to the court and not to a police officer.
The court also discussed the decision of the Apex Court in the case Sarah Mathew v Institute of Cardio Vascular Disease, wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that the relevant date was the date of filing of the complaint.
The court also noted that Sarah Mathew arose from a complaint made to the magistrate under Section 190(1)(a) and was not based on a police report.
The court in the case also looked into the decision in the case Arun Vyas v Anita Vyas, wherein the court held that cut-off date as the date on which the final report was filed and not the date of filing of the FIR. The court also noted that this decision was upheld by a three-judge bench in the case State of H.P. v. Tara Dutt and a two-judge bench in Ramesh v. State of T.N.
Further, the court noted that the earlier decision of the single judge had wrongly relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Sarah Mathew which was based on a complaint and thus did not subscribe to the view taken therein.
The court in the case observed and has directed the Magistrate to grant the opportunity of hearing to the accused and dispose of the petition within six weeks.
In the second case, it has been noted by the said court that though the crime was registered in 2015, no final report had been filed till date even though it should have been filed within 3 years. It has been opined by the said court that keeping the FIR pending would not serve any purpose and thus quashed the FIR.
The Advocates Mr. M Mohamed Riyaz and Mr. S Thiruvengadam also assisted the bar in the discussion.
The Counsel, Mr.R.Venkatesulu, Mr.M.Vijayaragavan appeared for the Petitioner.
The Counsel, Mr A.Damodaran Additional Public Prosecutor represented the respondent.
