Oc t o b e r 7, 2 02 0 marked the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossing the Upper Yangtze and entering into the territory controlled by Lhasa. While invading Eastern Tibet, Beijing had asserted that it was ‘liberating’ the Land of Snows, but seven decades later the Tibetans still disagree with this interpretation. Tragically, in this process, India lost a peaceful border.
Tibet, a Buddhist nation, was not militarily and tactically ready to oppose the seasoned troops of Mao (and some of China’s brilliant commanders). From the start, The Land of Snows stood no chance, especially without outside support from India or the West. Many believed that increasing the number of japa (recitation) or parikramas (circumambulations) would be sufficient to make the ‘truth prevail’. As Robert Ford, the British radio operator posted in Chamdo, remarked, “It seemed to me that something more Churchilian was needed.”
India was fooled into believing that Communist China wanted a ‘negotiated’ settlement with the Tibetans: it was never the case. Marshal Liu Bosheng, in a message in August 1950, had made it clear that he was going to ‘liberate’ Tibet. What happened 70 years ago is still relevant today, for several reasons.
First, the invasion of Tibet (and of Xinjiang, a few months earlier) by Communist China is the root cause of all the problems that India is facing on the northern border. In 1950, India accepted the fait accompli. Second, Delhi capitulated without a word of protest, even though her core interests were at stake. India still suffers due to the consequences of this blunder. Another lesson here is that one should be in a position of strength when one negotiates with China, and not let the situation deteriorate until it is too late.
India seemed to have learned a bit, as senior army commanders of India and China met on September 21 at Moldo, near the Line of Actual Control (LAC), in Chushul sector of eastern Ladakh.
The talks, which lasted 13 hours, were held to implement a fivepoint agreement reached in Moscow a few days earlier between the foreign ministers of the two countries to discuss the disengagement of troops and the de-escalation in Ladakh. Issued after the marathon encounter, a joint press release said: “The Indian and Chinese Senior Commanders held the 6th round of Military Commander-Level Meeting…They agreed to earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, strengthen communication on the ground, avoid misunderstandings and misjudgements, stop sending more troops to the frontline, refrain from unilaterally changing the situation on the ground…”
Already, many Indian commentators have applauded this: “We are talking to each other; a dialogue is taking place; each side has just to do some compromise and peace will prevail again.” In other words, it will be business as usual; the ‘experts’ will again be invited to China, working on self-styled Track-II diplomacy and the media will again publish ‘balanced’ columns on the eternal friendship. After all, the ‘experts’ argue, India would have lost only a few fingers.
That would be a sad ending; but we have already witnessed so many such finales since Independence. Hopefully this time, things could be different — the main reason being that the talks are conducted by the military. Corps commanders are far more familiar with the treacherous terrain and what a ridge means, even if not a blade of grass can grow on it (to paraphrase a former Prime Minister). Generals are acutely aware that the control of one of these peaks can make all the difference.
During the Sixth Round of talks, Lt Gen Harinder Singh, the commander of the Leh-based 14 Corps, was supported not only by Lt Gen P.G.K. Menon, who is expected to replace him next month, but the Indian delegation also included two division commanders, Maj Gen Abhijeet Bapat and Maj Gen Param Shekhawat, the local head of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and four brigadiers.
The presence of Naveen Srivastava, the Joint Secretary dealing with China in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), was also a positive sign. The Times of India stated: “It is for the first time that a senior official from the MEA was part of the high-level military talks aimed at defusing the volatile situation in the mountainous region.” India remained firm and insisted that China must “withdraw from all friction points”.
India’s fate changed for the better on the night of 29th-30th August when the PLA tried to take over the ridges south of the Pangong Lake. Some reports indicated that the number of Chinese troops may have been as high as 500. They suddenly came into contact with the Special Forces of Tibetan origin. The Chinese luck had turned. A communiqué of the Army said: “On the night of 29/30 August, PLA troops violated the consensus arrived at during military and diplomatic engagements…and carried out provocative military movements to change the status quo. …Indian troops preempted this PLA activity on the southern bank of Pangong Tso… and thwarted Chinese intentions to unilaterally change facts on ground.”
India now dominates many areas. This may be a sign that there is some light at the end of the tunnel, and for several reasons too. It rarely happens that India is able to preempt a Chinese move. Can you imagine if that had happened in October 1950? If, for example, India had occupied Chumbi Valley, as some Indian strategists had suggested at that time?
Delhi has finally understood that diplomacy requires a multi-pronged, multi-disciplinary approach involving all the stakeholders. Sardar Patel knew this: A few days before dying, he had constituted a Committee for the North and Northeastern borders under Maj Gen Himmatsinhji, Deputy Defence Minister. The committee also included Lt Gen Kulwant Singh, K. Zakaria, head of the MEA’s Historical Division, S.N. Haksar, Joint Secretary in MEA, Group Capt M.S. Chaturvedi from the Indian Air Force, and Waryam Singh, Deputy Director of the Intelligence Bureau. Thanks to the Committee’s wise guidance, Tawang is Indian today. Unfortunately, the principle of inviting all the concerned parties was immediately forgotten by Nehru, with disastrous consequences.
To conclude, let me mention another principle enunciated by Sardar Patel on 11 November 1950. Addressing a function in Mumbai, he had said, “In this kalyug, we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa. But if anybody resorted to force against us, we shall meet it with force.” This was his last public speech — and is something worth pondering upon!
