On 31 October, 1950 Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel celebrated in last birthday. His mind, however, was occupied with reports of China’s annexation of Tibet as published in that day’s newspaper. Being India’s Deputy Prime Minister, and Home Minister, he might have kept away from an external policy matter. He, however, could gauge the implication of the event on India’s external and internal security. India shared almost 2,000 miles of traditional (not legally ratified) border with Tibet, which acted as a buffer with China. The removal of this huge buffer, measuring a little less than five lakh square miles, meant the Dragon could now breathe down India’s neck. Never in her history had India to reckon with danger on her north and north-eastern frontiers. The Himalayas had made them impregnable. While delivering a birthday speech in Ahmedabad, Patel accused China of invading Tibet, a “free country”.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was also the External Affairs Minister, was more interested in cultivating friendly relations with Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic founded on 1 October, 1949. He saw it as continuation of Indian National Congress’ friendly relations with China during 1930s and early 1940s when China was ruled by Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang (Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party) government. It is not that Nehru did not perceive the consequences of removal of Tibetan buffer. However, like a typical Foreign Minister, he saw its consequences only for India’s neighbours. “What happens in Tibet immediately affects some of our border states like, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim” he wrote to V.K. Krishna Menon, India’s High Commissioner to Britain, on 18 August, 1950. (Sikkim joined Indian Union in May 1975). He could not foresee the consequence of the invasion on India’s internal security.
India adhered to the colonial position that Tibet was an autonomous territory under Chinese suzerainty. This was despite the fact that Tibet had been de facto independent of Peking since the 1911. Nehru was apprehensive that Peking could invade Tibet. However, he appears to have laid down his arms in advance. On 8 September a large Tibetan delegation led by their statesman and minister Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, met Nehru in New Delhi. Nehru ruled out the possibility of an independent Tibet; advised them to make up with Peking; and refused to play an active role in mediation. He told them point blank that India would not be able to help in case of Chinese invasion on Tibet. The Tibetan delegation returned empty handed and disappointed from New Delhi.
Nehru was worried about consequence of Chinese invasion of Tibet upon China’s own international image and standing. In his cable (dated 19 October 1950) to K.M. Panikkar, India’s ambassador to China, Nehru says, “It is quite clear to us that any invasion of Tibet by Chinese troops will have serious consequences in regard to their position in the United Nations. It will strengthen the hands of the enemies of China and weaken those who are supporting China’s cause there. Easy success in Tibet, which can be had any time later, will not counterbalance the loss in international sphere”.
Mao, unlike Nehru, was a Harrow graduate. It became evident that he could not care less about world opinion. By the time Nehru sent his next cable to Panikkar three days later, on 22 October, the PRC’s invasion of Tibet was already underway. Seemingly at his wits end Nehru writes: “I confess I am completely unable to understand urgency behind Chinese desire to ‘liberate’ when delay cannot possibly change the situation to her disadvantage. Anglo-Americans, no doubt, dislike China spreading out right up to Indian frontier but they are not in a position to do anything about it.” Nehru deplores China “attaches more importance to solution by force and lighting strokes than to slower and enduring methods of peaceful approach”.
Sardar Patel was a thorough realist. He was concerned about the invasion’s implication for India’s security rather than on China’s international image. Patel rushed back from Ahmedabad to New Delhi. On landing in the national capital he learnt that Chakrabarty Rajagopalachari, who had recently joined Nehru government as a minister without portfolio, was planning to oppose Nehru in the cabinet on the same issue. On 4 November, the newspapers reported that Tibet was a fait accompli. Patel, had a discussion with Foreign Secretary viz. Girija Shankar Bajpai who was equally unhappy with Nehru’s inept handling of Tibet situation.
On 7 November, 1950 Patel wrote a long letter to Nehru, which constitutes his only known intervention in foreign policy sphere. Therein Patel says, “We have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet that gave us no trouble”. He further observes, “Our defence measures have so far been based on calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with Communist China in the north and in the northeast a Communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us”. In his long letter (Sardar Patel, Select Correspondence 1945-50, Vol II, Edited by V. Shankar, P.320-327) Patel also expresses concern on how China’s direct access to Indian frontier bodes ill for India’s mixed Northeast population. The infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and Communists would become easy. This might lead to growth of insurgency in the Northeast.
Patel’s hard thinking on annexation of Tibet contrasted with Nehru’s vacuous musings. He had decided to confront Nehru in the next meeting of Union cabinet. However, as biographer Rajmohan Gandhi informs, “Shortly after this the health of Vallabhbhai collapsed, and the tussle over foreign policy never took place.” Sardar Patel passed away in Bombay on 15 December 1950.
Nehru’s luck apparently supported him for the time being. However, he began to run out of it within years, as the People Liberation Army’s border incursions began to mount. In the mid-1950s, those were the heady days of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai. This time Nehru was alert to pinpricks, and repeatedly took up the issue conscientiously with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. The Chinese mislead Nehru saying that the PRC yet did not have to time to revise the old Guomindang era maps by undertaking surveys. Incursions were a result of mistake, since the Indo-Chinese (actually IndoTibetan) border was neither delineated on the map nor demarcated on ground.
Nehru, however, practiced the worst self-deception by imagining that the Chinese would never attack. His misplaced faith in China hit India hard when Chinese forces overran the Indian post at Dhola, in NEFA, to advance further south of Namkha Chu river on 21 October 1962 while opening a second front in Pangong Lake in Ladakh almost 3,000 km away on the very same day. The IndiaChina War, 1962, was underway. In those worst hours of India’s external security, Nehru might have been reminded of Sardar Patel’s warnings on Tibet.
The writer is an author and independent researcher based in New Delhi. The opinions expressed herein are his personal.
